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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3510 
____________          
                                       
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOEMON D. HIGDON, 
a/k/a JOEMON HIGDOM, 
a/k/a JOEMON DEANDRE HIGDON 
 
Joemon D. Higdon, Appellant 
___________                       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-09-cr-00742-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
___________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 21, 2012 
 
Before:    AMBRO, VANASKIE AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: August 16, 2012) 
___________                      
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
Joemon D. Higdon was convicted by a jury on one count of possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Higdon now appeals, 
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arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion to bifurcate the 
trial and by preventing him from cross-examining the arresting officers on the legality of 
his arrest.  Higdon further contends that the District Court erroneously denied his motions 
to suppress evidence that he alleges was recovered after an illegal seizure.  We reject 
each of Higdon’s arguments and will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
I. 
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case.  Accordingly, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.   
 On September 20, 2009, police officers responding to a radio call about an 
individual in a pink shirt with a gun on the 5500 block of Beaumont Street in 
Philadelphia came across Higdon, who was on the sidewalk of Beaumont Street wearing 
a pink and white striped shirt.  The officers testified that when they asked Higdon to stop, 
he instead continued walking away from them after looking back in their direction 
momentarily.  After a few steps, Higdon crouched beside a minivan and the officers then 
heard the sound of a metallic object hitting the ground.  One of the officers recovered the 
object, which turned out to be a handgun.  Higdon continued to walk away from the 
officers until he was intercepted and detained.   
Higdon was indicted by a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for 
one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in or affecting interstate 
commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The statute states in relevant part that:  
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person— (1) who has been 
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. . . to ship or 
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transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or 
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive 
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
 
Id. 
Higdon filed a motion to suppress the firearm recovered by the police at the time 
of his arrest.  The District Court held a hearing and denied the motion to suppress, and 
then denied Higdon’s motion to reconsider.   
At trial, despite the government’s objection, the District Court refused to inform 
the jury that Higdon had been previously convicted of a felony, barred the government 
from presenting evidence to establish that the handgun had traveled in interstate 
commerce, and deviated significantly from the Third Circuit model jury instructions.  
Because of this, the jury was never made aware of two of the three elements required for 
a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The jury ultimately deadlocked, and a retrial 
was scheduled. 
 Prior to the retrial, the government filed a motion in limine requesting that the 
District Court inform the jury at the outset of the trial of the charge against Higdon, that 
the government be permitted to present to the jury evidence and argument regarding each 
of the elements of the offense, and that the Court instruct the jury at the conclusion of the 
trial on the elements of the crime.  Higdon opposed the motion, and the District Court 
denied it.  The government filed an appeal and petitioned for mandamus, and we granted 
relief, and further directed that the case be reassigned to a different District Judge.  See 
United States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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 At this point Higdon renewed a prior motion to bifurcate the trial that had been 
stayed by the District Court pending the government’s appeal.  Under Higdon’s motion, 
the jury would be informed of the prior felony element, but only after it determined 
whether Higdon possessed the firearm.  The District Court denied Higdon’s motion.  The 
retrial began on May 31, 2011, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.  The District Court 
imposed a sentence of 240 months of imprisonment, along with a five-year term of 
supervised release, a fine of $2,000, and a special assessment of $100.  Higdon now 
appeals. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
A. 
 Higdon first argues that the District Court erroneously denied his motion to 
bifurcate the trial.  Higdon contends that what distinguishes the crime of felon-in-
possession from other offenses is that the government is allowed to inform the jury of the 
defendant’s criminal history, even if this information is otherwise irrelevant.  As such, 
Higdon believes the District Court’s failure to bifurcate the trial irreversibly prejudiced 
the jury against him. 
 We review a District Court’s trial management decisions for abuse of discretion.  
Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citation omitted).  Our review is plenary, however, when such rulings are based on an 
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interpretation of law.  See Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 964 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations 
omitted).   
We had specifically noted in the government’s pre-trial appeal that bifurcation 
under these circumstances was unlikely to be justified.  Higdon, 638 F.3d at 244 (citing 
United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1223 (3d Cir. 1995)) (“[W]e have rejected a 
bifurcated procedure under similar circumstances.”).  This is because “Higd[o]n’s prior 
conviction is not merely a consequential fact, it is an element of the crime charged.”  Id. 
at 243.  As such, “bifurcation would deprive the jury of knowledge of the very crime with 
which the defendant was charged, which [is] an untenable result.”  Id. at 244 n.8 (citing 
Jacobs, 44 F.3d at 1223).   
 Possession of a firearm is not only legal for most people – it is a constitutional 
right.  See U.S. Const. amend. II.  It would cause undue confusion to have a jury first 
determine whether Higdon in fact possessed the firearm.  A reasonable juror would 
properly question why Higdon’s possession was criminal.  See United States v. 
Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Possession of a firearm by most people is 
not a crime.  A juror who owns or who has friends and relatives who own firearms may 
wonder why [the defendant]’s possession was illegal.  Doubt as to the criminality of [the 
defendant]’s conduct may influence the jury when it considers the possession element.”).  
“As we explained in Jacobs, bifurcation under these circumstances puts the jury in the 
difficult position of deciding the guilt or innocence of a defendant without knowing all of 
the elements of the crime that is charged.”  Higdon, 638 F.3d at 244 n.8 (citing Jacobs, 
44 F.3d at 1222).  Accordingly, the District Court’s decision to deny Higdon’s motion for 
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bifurcation was not premised upon an erroneous interpretation of governing law, nor did 
it amount to an abuse of discretion. 
B. 
 Higdon next argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it prevented 
him from questioning the arresting officers on the legality of his arrest during cross-
examination.  Higdon wished to develop a theory that the officers had fabricated the 
“crouch and drop” story to justify their stop of Higdon.  The District Court barred this 
line of inquiry, however, because the legality of the arrest had already been determined 
when Higdon’s motion to suppress was denied.  Furthermore, the District Court was 
concerned that this line of questioning would confuse jurors.  Higdon argues that this 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. 
 We review limitations on cross-examination under the abuse of discretion 
standard.  United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 208 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  We 
have established a two-part test to determine whether a District Court’s limitation on 
cross-examination violates the Confrontation Clause: (1) did the ruling significantly 
inhibit the defendant’s effective exercise of his right to inquire into the witness’s 
motivation in testifying; and if so, (2) were the constraints imposed on the scope of cross-
examination within those reasonable limits that a District Court, in due exercise of its 
discretion, is authorized to establish?  United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1006 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2003)).   
 The District Court’s ruling did not significantly inhibit Higdon’s ability to 
challenge the credibility of the arresting officers.  The District Court allowed Higdon’s 
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counsel to question the officers on two police reports completed after the arrest, for 
example, and both officers admitted that neither report said anything about Higdon 
crouching or the sound of a metallic object hitting the ground.  The District Court only 
stopped Higdon’s counsel when he attempted to question one of the officers about his 
“understanding of what you’re allowed to do in a situation like this.”  (A. 88.)  As the 
District Court observed at a sidebar conference, this line of questioning would effectively 
amount to “litigating the motion to suppress in front of [the jury].”  (A. 89.)  The District 
Court then explained to the jury the difference between legal and factual questions in an 
attempt to dispel any potential confusion, and Higdon’s counsel began a new line of 
questioning.   
“[A] district court ‘retains wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is 
concerned to impose reasonable limits’ on cross-examination to avoid . . . confusion of 
issues.”  Lore, 430 F.3d at 208 (quoting United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 169 (3d 
Cir. 2005)).  The District Court neither significantly inhibited Higdon’s effective exercise 
of his Confrontation Clause rights, nor were the constraints imposed outside of those 
reasonable limits that a District Court, in its discretion, has authority to establish.   
C. 
Higdon last argues that the District Court erroneously denied his motion to 
suppress because the arresting officers had unlawfully seized him when they asked him to 
stop.  Higdon contends that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him 
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), as he was merely dressed in attire similar to the 
clothing the individual described in the radio call was wearing.  As such, Higdon argues 
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that the handgun should not have been admitted because it was recovered after an illegal 
seizure.   
We review a District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the 
underlying facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).  We exercise 
plenary review, however, of the District Court’s application of the law to those facts.  Id.   
A seizure occurs where there is either an application of physical force to restrain 
movement, or submission to a show of police authority.  United States v. Brown, 448 
F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 
(1991)).  “[I]f a suspect in the absence of physical force does not submit to an officer’s 
show of authority, there is no seizure and no Fourth Amendment claim.”  Brown, 448 
F.3d at 245 (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626-27).  Because there was no physical force 
applied here and because Higdon did not actually stop in response to the officers’ 
demand, he cannot be considered to have been seized under the Fourth Amendment.  The 
officers may have made a show of authority, but Higdon failed to comply with this 
authority.  While Higdon did turn briefly to look at the officers in response to their 
command, a seizure requires submission to police authority that is “something more than 
a momentary pause.”  United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in denying Higdon’s motion to suppress. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
